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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the inter-linkages between the water and energy sectors and their 
planning processes, by describing a comprehensive analytical tool developed to evaluate 
water energy nexus operational cost trends and planning to assist decision makers in 
exploring and evaluating alternative courses of action. Brazil has been chosen as a case 
study, because its electricity production is highly dependent on water to keep affordable 
tariffs, which in turn also serves as input to other important sectors, such as water 
services and sanitation, and raises disputes especially in basins marked by water 
scarcity, such as the São Francisco basin. In light of hydrological factors (e.g., droughts) 
and non-hydrological factors (e.g., chronic delays in delivery of new plants) there has 
been water availability constraints for electricity generation and energy prices have 
risen, while water quantity and quality have decreased for multiple users. Both of which 
impact negatively on water services and sanitation providers, because electricity figures 
as their fastest growing costs in times when they need more energy to source water from 
longer distances, or deeper levels because of water quantity and quality issues. Energy 
and water are characterized as common pool resources with planning processes along 
silos in Brazil that do not serve well the purpose of sustainable development. Better 
integrated water-energy plans at basin level is the alternative proposed under this paper 
to advance sustainability and mitigate the risks related to water scarcity that have 
resulted in negative impacts on both electricity and water sectors.    
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INTRODUCTION 
The operational-resource interdependency between water and energy (WE) is a subject of 
several nexus studies that look into the complex interactions between them, which 
traditionally were based on silo thinking. Most studies have analysed quantitatively the trade-
offs in resource use between water and energy, because water is used, consumed, and 
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degraded to produce and deliver energy, while energy is necessary to secure, treat, distribute 
and deliver water. This way, there are competing interests and trade-offs to be considered 
between them. For instance, Carillo and Frei [1] quantified both the water withdrawal and 
consumption for energy purposes in Spain to find out that hydropower is the most water 
intensive source of energy. Hydropower plants are highly water intensive, because large 
volumes of water evaporate from the increased reservoir surface [2]. Nevertheless, sustainable 
multi-purpose use dams have the potential to support the management of water for multiple 
uses. Conflicts are raised to the extent that it is necessary to store water in reservoirs in benefit 
of energy security and affordable energy, while it is also necessary to promote minimum 
levels of water flow downstream of these developments in benefit of multiple water users. 
Countries like Brazil are greatly dependent on hydroelectric power (63% of total installed 
capacity [3]) and in the past 15 years have experienced depletion of its reservoirs, with power 
shortages, rising electricity costs and issues of water quantity and quality that result in 
negative consequences to both the water and energy sectors. On the other hand, thermal 
power plants also require water for fuel extraction and processing, likewise for cooling down 
of systems at power stations, which are more or less water intensive depending on the source 
and dry cooling technologies [2]. Nuclear plants use the most water, followed by coal and 
waste-incineration plants and natural gas plants [4]. In France, the electricity industry 
withdrew and consumed 65% of the total water supply in 2010 and estimates show that by 
2040 it will rise to 80% [5]. More than 18 billion cubic meters of water are required for 
nuclear operations, which uses more freshwater than agriculture and industry [6]. In 
extremely hot seasons like in 2003, France was forced to reduce its energy load (7-15% 
reduction of its nuclear electricity supply) because water quantity was not sufficient to cool 
down nuclear systems [7]. In the United States around 80% of the electricity is sourced by 
thermoelectricity and withdrawal of water for cooling represents 44% of water withdrawn 
nationally [8]. Although dry-cooling technologies exist, they increase capital costs and can 
result in losses of efficiency [9]. The more the energy sector relies on water, the greater the 
vulnerability of energy generation to competing uses of water and water scarcity [8]. For 
example, expanding bioenergy to advance renewable energy targets adds additional pressure 
on freshwater footprint and may increase water stress on ecosystems and food production 
[10]. Water footprints of biomass have been estimated to be in the range of 24-243 m3 [11]. 
Semertzidis et al. [12] concluded that if sugarcane crops were to require irrigation in Brazil, 
the water intensity of these bioenergy crops in terms of “average crop water use” would 
increase from 9,627 to 15,942 m3/ha/yr. The expansion of biomass and biofuel crops to areas 
with lower precipitation levels will necessarily raise irrigation needs and disputes between 
multiple water users.  
On the other hand, the water sector’s reliance on centralised water-dependent electricity 
also raises its vulnerability connected to water-stress even further. The interdependency is 
particular important in water-stressed areas, because both hydroelectric and thermal power are 
highly dependent on water to produce electricity, while these areas also increasingly depend 
on energy-intensive water services. More energy is also gradually needed for wastewater 
treatment to the levels that will promote sustainable management of water resources. For 
example, in the European Union the Water Framework Directive requires ‘good ecological 
status’ for all surface, inland and coastal water, which in turn will increase energy use for 
wastewater treatment by almost 100% [13]. 11% of the World’s hydroelectric capacity and 
47% of world’s thermal power capacity are in highly water-stressed areas [14]. Under some 
scenarios, water demand from the power sector is expected to grow worldwide, in Latin 
America by 360% by 2050, in Africa by 500% and in Asia up to 350 % based on 2010 figures 
[15]. A rise is projected on water stress in many regions due to climate change and population 
growth, aggravated by increases of water demands for industry, cities and agriculture, which 
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will require greater amounts of energy for strategies such as water transfers, desalination and 
pumping of water from underground levels. For example, in the Middle East and North Africa 
region the water supply strategies such as ground water pumping consumes 9% of total 
annual electrical consumption in Saudi Arabia, while desalination accounts for 5-12% of total 
electricity consumption in the Arabian Gulf [16]. In Australia, the adaptation to water scarcity 
in many areas has increased energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions [17].  
At the core of W-E nexus research is the understanding of critical trade-offs, competing 
demand and identification of synergies and gaps for a more cohesive resource governance in 
benefit of security of supply and efficiency. Understanding the causes and the complex 
interaction between water and energy requires a broad understanding of various factors 
including management, policies and planning that governs water and energy resources. Most 
water-energy nexus studies focus on the technical approach to understand the physical 
connections of resource use between competing users. There are some studies that have 
moved into the realm of resource governance, planning and policy adaptation. Sovacool [18] 
suggests that ‘electricity-water crisis areas’ can serve as useful policy tools. Siddiqi et al. [19] 
argue that integrated policy and planning is necessary to meet challenges of energy and water 
in Jordan. They recommend boundary-spanning intermediaries as the way forward by 
leveraging existing links between agents and organizations, or by merging existing 
organizations of distinct domains to create a new integrated entity and achieve the necessary 
linkages in future resource development strategies [19]. King et al. [20] argue that the first 
obstacle that needs to be addressed for better integrated energy-water policies is the 
informational challenge. This can be improved through well-structured databases and 
reporting requirements. A cross-sector perspective can help avoid policies that rather shift an 
issue from one sector to the other, instead of solving it [20]. For instance, Kumar [21] 
analysed the issues of insufficient supply of water and energy in environmentally sensitive 
hill towns in India and proposed regulatory interventions related to both that could be 
incorporated into building regulations. Scott et al. [22] argue that it isn’t just a matter of 
planning for optimal resource use, but one of redesigning water-intensive power generation 
and energy-intensive water supply technology to reduce mutual impacts through policies that 
consider their joint management and help unlock potential of conservation, efficiency and 
renewable resources. Peel [23] brings forward the common elements that can be extracted 
from literature to advance integrated policy issues, which include: (i) the need of multiple 
policy instruments that go beyond market-based approaches to promote integration; (ii) 
distribution of power between scales with a preference to decentralised systems; (iii) broad 
participation of multiple stakeholders; (iv) well-developed information and tools such as 
robust planning; and (v) move towards a more adaptive decision making approach with a 
focus on adaptation over time. Pittock et al. [24] conclude that only integrated and multi-
objective planning can deliver a more fair and equitable access to resources despite the 
contrasts among scale and trade-offs between water, energy and food. Bach et al. [25] 
recommend a basin-wide perspective for integration by encouraging a cooperative 
management through multi-stakeholder dialogue and discussions of risks.  
In general, authors highlight the need for co-management across sectors of water and 
energy, whereby joint planning, policies and solutions could make action more sustainable 
and cost-efficient. The three main perspectives to advance nexus governance are technical, 
administrative and political [26]. The dominant technical-administrative approach focuses on 
risks, security and economic rationales. While the third perspective considers that addressing 
trade-offs is a political process that should be negotiated amongst multiple stakeholders [26]. 
In light of the limitations involving these current perspectives there are identifiable gaps. This 
paper contributes to the literature by proposing an analytical tool to capture water–energy 
nexus operational cost trends and also support better integrated planning at basin level due to 
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issues of water quantity and quality. As recognised by Gassert et al. [27] more detailed, 
locally sourced data should be considered when assessing water-related risks and supporting 
decision–making processes. As a case study we considered Brazil because of its dependency 
on hydropower and the drought events over the past ten years which stressed the problems in 
terms of energy and water governance and planning.   
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Population growth, urbanisation and industrialisation intensify water and energy’s 
interactions and the need for considering their trade-offs. By 2035 global energy use will 
increase between 35-40% [28]. Consumption in emerging economies like Brazil, China and 
India are expected to double by 2035 [29] (World Energy Council, 2010). The International 
Energy Agency projected that withdrawals for power plants will increase 35% and reach up 
790 billion cubic metres, whereby 130 cubic metres would be consumed and never returned to 
the local hydrological cycle [29]. Water is also necessary for agriculture, industrial processes 
and human consumption, with the highest demands for drinking water, sanitation and 
drainage under urban centres. Forecast shows that 68%of the world’s population will be 
living in urban centres by 2050 [30]. All of which, will raise demands for both energy and 
water and increase pressure on resources, land use, hydrology, carbon emissions, water 
reserves and the environment. Climate change creates an additional pressure because it 
impacts on precipitation levels, frequency of floods and droughts, with direct impact on water 
availability and quality. Given both sectors heavily rely on each other the failures of one are 
likely to result in a flow of failures on the other. A lack of integrated planning between these 
sectors not only undermines efforts to create sustainable energy and water systems, but also 
underpins environmental injustices. There is limited understanding on how to tackle these 
complex interactions in the context of developing countries. Approaches to water and energy 
scarcities and stress usually consider supply side solutions, such as more power plants and 
dams, water transfers and flood levees. Soft-path solutions in benefit of sustainability, with 
lower consumption and fewer impacts on the environment with decentralised systems, more 
solar photovoltaic and demand management can only be considered through joint planning 
processes. Local and regional decision-making for water and energy has the potential to raise 
opportunities for adaptation to global change processes and the sustainability and climate 
agendas. This paper will advance the notion that water, and energy are coupled at multiple 
scales to support integration of planning at basin level and help move the water-energy nexus 
beyond an input-output relationship. 
METHODS 
An analytical tool has been developed (Figure 1) to analyse cost trends resulting from the 
regulatory framework that concentrates risks on big hydroelectric projects, but increasingly 
relies on thermal power due to multiple hydrological and non-hydrological factors that impact 
on reservoir levels and hydro contribution to supply. A variable economic value is allocated 
to the energy produced by hydropower plants, so that it is lowest when reservoirs are full and 
higher when there are reductions of the stored water in reservoirs. This way, the electricity 
system’s operation planning and definition of prices are directly influenced by levels of stored 
water under reservoirs and hydropower contribution to supply. 
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Figure 1. Analytical tool for water-energy nexus operational cost trends  
 
[1] CMO (R$/MWh) = marginal operational costs of the electricity system, calculated for each subsystem.  
[2] PLD (R$/MWh) = settlement price of short-term market for electricity trade calculated in line with the CMO, limited to a maximum and minimum set by the energy 
regulator 
[3] GSF = ratio between generation and physical guarantee of hydropower plants needs to be equal to 1, or 100%, or else it results in negative GSF and exposure of producers 
under the short-term market  
[4] ESS (R$/MWh) = energy services charge created to cover the costs of dispatches of thermal power plants outside the economic model 
[5] CDE repass =CDE is a sectoral fund that serves to cover costs of several electricity public policies,  
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Considering the hydrological and non-hydrological factors that impact on the levels of 
reservoirs and hydro generation, more thermal and less hydro generation results in higher 
marginal operational costs (CMO). The CMO is calculated according to hydrological 
conditions, energy demand, fuel costs, dispatch of new generation plants and transmission 
lines, which altogether determine the costs of production by the model and the optimal 
dispatch of hydro-generation and thermal power under each electricity subsystem. In general 
terms, the CMO rises in relation to the fuel costs of the most representative thermal plant 
brought online on a given period. It is assumed that hydropower is always the most 
economical source of electricity. However, this assumption leads to higher future costs due to 
higher risks of energy deficit. The security of the system depends on water storage, which 
means more thermal power is required to help safeguard water and secure supply. Risk 
aversion mechanisms can enhance energy security of supply and help guarantee minimum 
levels of water are stored under reservoirs [31]. These mechanisms establish new criteria for 
calculating the CMO and the frequency of dispatches of thermal power plants, so the model 
can capture better the uncertainties of water inflows and future costs. Under the economic 
rationale, the higher the CMO, the higher the risk of energy deficit, the higher the PLD and 
more funds from regulatory charges are necessary to cover operational costs.  
Dispatches of thermal power plants can also happen outside the economic model in 
benefit of energy security and because of electric restriction. However, additional funds from 
regulatory charges, such as energy services charges (ESS) are necessary to cover the 
additional costs of these dispatches outside the economic model. In light of hydrological and 
non-hydrological factors (Figure 1), thermal plants are increasingly brought online, according 
to their costs of production, from the lowest to highest, while hydro generation gradually 
decreases its contribution to supply. This impacts negatively on multiple stakeholders, 
including producers and suppliers of electricity due to increased cost trends, which also 
impacts consumers. For example, hydropower producers struggle with non-voluntary 
exposure under the short-term market when the PLD is very high, which result in financial 
burdens related to Generation Scaling Factor (Figure 1). On the other hand, suppliers struggle 
with fuel cost payments related to thermal power plant generation, which raise their short-
term costs associated with electricity (Figure 1). The transferring of costs to consumers lead 
to higher energy bills and potential energy poverty. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS – BRAZIL AS A CASE STUDY 
Brazil has a long history of large-scale hydroelectric power generation, which is one of 
the well-known dimensions of the nexus between water and energy. Water is the backbone of 
the Brazilian energy sector and according to its expansion plans it will continue to serve this 
purpose. The 10-year plan for energy shows that the total installed capacity of electricity is 
expected to increase from 132,9 GW to 206,4 GW between 2015 and 2024 [32]. Hydropower 
projects should contribute with 28.349 MW, representing one third of all investments [32]. 
The energy sector has historically acted as one the principal management agents and users of 
water, with damns mainly developed for the exclusive use of hydropower and to assure 
regular flows of water in seasonal rivers. The installed capacity of hydroelectric generation 
grew from 13,724 MW in 1974 to 96,925 MW in 2016 [33]. Followed by thermal power 
plants, which grew from 4,409 MW in 1974 to 41,275 MW in 2016 [33]. Thermal power was 
mainly developed to serve as back-up of the electricity system and enhance security of 
supply, but it is increasingly serving to complement base load. Between 2004 and 2016 the 
total installed capacity of thermal power doubled from 19,556 MW to 41,275 MW (Figure 2). 
Despite the growing installed capacity of hydropower for the same period, its contribution to 
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supply decreased from 74% in 2004 to 68% in 2016 [33] due to hydrological and non-
hydrological factors made evident in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 2. Hydropower and thermal power installed capacity in Brazil between 1974-2016 
 
According to the national legislation [34], the choice of electricity source should be based 
on economic merit and energy security, whereby the aim of the system is to service demand at 
any given time, at the lowest possible cost, guaranteeing risks of energy deficit be kept equal 
or below 5% under each individual subsystem: North (N), Northeast (NE), Centre-Southeast 
(C-SE) and South (S) (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Four subsystems of the electricity sector (Adapted after [35]) 
 
The risk of energy deficit is a percentage obtained from hydrological simulations that 
result in a marginal operational cost (CMO) equal to or above R$ 4,650.00/MWh and requires 
rationing of electricity [36]. The higher the CMO, the higher the risks of energy deficit and 
the risks of energy rationing. Before 2017, the risk of energy deficit was split into four tiers, 
updated every year. In 2015 the tiers varied between CMOs of R$1,420.34/MWh and 
N 
NE 
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S 
Journal of Sustainable Development of Energy, Water  
and Environment Systems 
Year XXXX 
Volume X, IssueY, pp xx-yy 
 
 
Page assigned by journal 
 
R$7,276.40//MWh [37] (Table 1). Each tier required different percentages of load reduction 
through electricity rationing (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Energy deficit cost levels and load reductions for 2015 [37] 
 
Tiers Deficit cost 
(R$/MWh) 
Levels (% of load reduction – LR) 
1 1,420.34 0% LR  5% 
2 3,064.15 5% LR  10% 
3 6,403.81 10% LR  20% 
4 7,276.40 LR > 20% 
 
Even though in January 2015 the CMO reached levels beyond the first tier under the NE 
and C-SE subsystems, the government did not implement any rationing measures, which led 
to further depletion of reservoirs and increased use of thermal power generation (including 
outside the economic model). It has been assumed that all existing thermal power plants were 
needed for uninterrupted months in the severe drought period of 2014-15, which contributed 
to the rise of the CMO. For example, during the months of April 2015 to August 2015, 
thermal plants with variable unitary cost of over R$1,100/MWh were brought online [38]. 
Consequently, there are many still growing economic, social and environmental burdens to all 
stakeholders. For instance, when thermal plants with variable unitary costs R$422.56/MWh 
are dispatched, the red flag applies, which can result in additional costs to the energy bill of 
R$3.00 for each 100 kWh of energy consumption (R$422.56  R$610 MWh); or R$5.00 if 
thermal power plants with variable unitary costs above R$610 /MWh are needed [38]. Plants 
with variable unitary costs equal to or above R$211.28/MWh and below R$422.56/MWh 
require the application of the yellow flag and there is an additional R$1.00 for each 100kWh 
of consumption [38]. There is no addition to the energy bill when thermal power plants 
brought online have variable unitary costs below 211.28/MWh (green flag tariff). The red flag 
was applied throughout the entire year of 2015 [38]. For the baseline year (2015), the 
coloured-flag tariffs were applied individually for each subsystem, according to the sum of 
the CMO and energy services charge [39]. Then, the flags were defined for the whole system, 
based on the highest Variable Unit Cost (CVU) of the last thermal power plant dispatched 
according to the economic rationale or in benefit of energy security [38]. The funds collected 
through the coloured flag tariffs are centralised under a common account and are supposed to 
cover the following costs [40]: (i) power purchase agreements of availability of energy under 
the regulated market (thermal power generation fuel costs); (ii) results of short-term market; 
(iii) hydrological risk of hydropower plants under quota-regime (related to forcefully reduced 
tariffs by government); (iv) energy service charge connected to thermal dispatches outside the 
economic model; and (v) hydrological risks of hydropower producers under the regulated 
market. There is a deficit in this account, because the amounts collected thus far have not 
been sufficient to cover all the accumulating costs. In October 2017 the deficit reached around 
R$4.36 bn, which will need to be compensated in the near future through coloured-flag tariffs, 
annual tariff revisions and tariff readjustments that happen every four years [41]. This 
indicates energy bills will continue to rise exponentially.  
The two most critical energy subsystems are the Centre-Southeast and the Northeast. 
Both represent risks, because together they are responsible for nearly 90% of total storage 
capacity of the Brazilian electricity system [42]. They have the majority of the large-scale 
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reservoirs and the highest concentration of people, agrobusiness and industrial activities. 
Despite the growing contribution of thermal source to safeguard water under both subsystems, 
it was also necessary for major hydropower plants to reduce levels of water discharges below 
the minimum set under exiting permits to avoid major dams from drying out. For example, 
the three major hydropower developments – Sobradinho, Três Marias and Luiz Gonzaga – 
which hold 96.6% of total storage capacity of electricity of the Northeast subsystem have 
reduced significantly their discharge levels (Figure4). They are located under the São 
Francisco watershed in the largest river starting and finishing within Brazil that is facing the 
worst reductions on water flow in recent history. Whereas the São Francisco river had an 
average discharge of 2000 m3/s, it currently stands at 550 m3/s [43]. Energy is an important 
water user, with installed hydropower capacity of 10.708 MW (12% of Brazil’s total capacity) 
[43]. Sobradinho holds 58.25% of the total energy storage capacity and plays a fundamental 
role on the management of water for its multiple uses and energy security [43]. The first 
authorization to reduce the minimum water discharge levels for Sobradinho from 1,300 m3/s 
to 1,100 m3/s was in 2013 [44]. Further reductions authorised by the competent regulatory 
and environmental bodies decreased the discharge levels to 900 m3/s (2015) [45]; 800 m3/s 
(2016) [46]; 700 m3/s (2016) [47]; and 550/523 m3/s (2017) [48]. This has impacted on the 
generation characteristics of the Northeast subsystem, imports from other subsystems, energy 
costs and on water quality, quantity and multiple water users. Figure 5 shows the reductions 
in hydro generation by the main hydropower plants located under the São Francisco basin: 
Sobradinho, Xingó, Luiz Gonzaga and Três Marias. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Reduction in discharge levels of main hydropower plants of NE subsystem 
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Figure 5. Hydro generation reductions by main hydropower plants of NE subsystem 
 
Figure6 shows the consequent rises in thermal power, the marginal operational costs 
(CMO) and the PLD for the NE subsystem. The higher the CMO the higher the PLD, but 
whereas there are no limits to how much the CMO can rise, the PLD is limited by regulatory 
cap that is established on early basis by energy regulatory agency (Figure6).The PLD is one 
of the key factors that determines the application of the coloured-flag tariffs. The steep fall of 
the PLD in January 2015 (despite CMO being high) shown under Figure6 is because the cap 
price of PLD was changed by energy regulator. Moreover, Figure 6 shows that increases in 
wind power generation in 2016wasone of the main factors that helped decrease the marginal 
operational costs and consequently the PLD in the NE subsystem.  
 
 
Figure 6. Rises in thermal power, marginal operational costs and the PLD for the NE subsystem 
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To some extent, a similar situation occurred under the Centre-Southeast subsystem (C-
SE). However, different from NE where the energy storage capacity is mainly under one 
critical watershed (São Francisco), the C-SE has its main reservoirs under eight different 
basins: Paraíba do Sul, Tocantins, Grande, Paraná, Paranaiba, Paranapanema, São Francisco 
and Tietê [42]. The most critical being the Paraíba do Sul and Tocantins, where it has also 
been necessary to reduce hydropower’s minimum discharge below environmental permit 
levels. The Paraíba do Sul holds 3.2% of energy storage of the C-SE subsystem [42] and is 
located between the biggest industrial and populational poles (São Paulo, Minas Gerais and 
Rio de Janeiro). Hydropower plants have reduced discharge levels from 30 m3/s to 7 m3/s 
(Paraibuna); from 40 m3/s to 10 m3/s (Santa Branca); from 80 m3/s to 60 m3/s (Funil); and 
from 10 m3/s to 4 m3/s (Jaguari) [49]. Nonetheless, these developments are supposed to 
guarantee adequate water flow for the operation of Santa Cecília reservoir that secures water 
supply to Rio de Janeiro. Under the Tocantins watershed, the hydropower Serra da Mesa that 
holds 17.35% of the total energy storage capacity of C-SE has reduced its discharge level 
from 320m3/s to 100 m3/s [50]. Despite reductions in hydro generation by these and other 
hydropower plants under the C-SE electricity subsystem, it faces a different situation than NE 
subsystem. Figure7 shows the hydro generation for the NE subsystem, while Figure8 has the 
hydro generation for the C-SE between 2013-2017. Furthermore, Figure 9 shows the rises in 
thermal power and increases in the marginal operational costs (CMO) and the PLD for the C-
SE subsystem. 
 
 
Figure 7. Hydro generation NE subsystem 
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Figure 8. Hydro generation C-SE subsystem 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Rising thermal power, marginal operational costs and PLD for the C-SE subsystem 
 
One of the main problems of reductions in hydro generation under both subsystems, 
which was aggravated by the drought, is that many producers were generating less than their 
total assured output under the Energy Reallocation Mechanisms (MRE). Consequently, the 
Generation Scaling Factor (GSF) - which is the percentage of energy that all generators in the 
MRE produce in relation to the MRE’s total guaranteed power output in a given month − was 
constantly below 1, or 100%. The combination of low GSF and high PLD impacted 
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negatively on the financial stability of energy producers. Hydropower producers that were 
generating less than their guaranteed output under the MRE battle with their repeated and 
non-voluntary exposure under the short-term market when the PLD was very high, which has 
led to GSF financial burdens as follows: R$2.8 bn (2013), R$ 26.8 bn (2014), R$ 20.0 bn 
(2015) and R$ 39.7 bn (2017) [38]. Because several non-hydrological factors led to their 
exposure, such as delays on delivery of new plants and transmission lines, it is considered that 
producers transfer the risks to consumers under the argument that these costs go beyond their 
contractual obligations that are limited to risks of hydrological nature. In 2015, the federal 
government edited a new law that transferred the costs of these risks to the consumers under 
the regulated energy trade market [51]. These costs are to be covered by the revenues of the 
coloured-flag tariffs. However, only the hydropower producers under the regulated market for 
electricity transferred costs to captive consumers of energy suppliers, which includes water 
services and sanitation providers. The financial burdens of producers under the free market 
for electricity trade continue to grow and questions are raised about how to remedy such debts 
that are raising many operational, legal and financial risks. Other costs transferred to 
consumers are related to the financial burdens assumed by electricity suppliers in light of their 
exposure under spot market in connection to Provisional Measure 579 of 2012. Electricity 
suppliers face huge financial burdens related to this political decision that forcefully reduced 
tariffs [52] but led to their unforeseen exposure under the short-term market when the PLD 
was very high and resulted in unexpected rise in their electricity costs and obligations, which 
were not covered by the energy tariffs. To cover these costs the following actions were taken: 
(i) transferring of funds from the national treasury; (ii) the chambers for electricity trade 
entered into a loan agreement in name of the electricity suppliers; (iii) transferring of funds 
from coloured-flag tariffs; (iv) and tariff revisions that reached up to 40% in 2015 [53]. 
Moreover, when thermal power plants are dispatched, distribution companies should bear 
variable fuel costs payments and imbalance settlement cost/revenues [54]. In 2014 variable 
fuel costs reached R$ 17.5 billion, while the combination of fuel costs and imbalance 
settlement led distributors to a combined turnover of R$62 billion in 2014 [54]. The monthly 
revenues of the coloured-flag tariffs are also used to cover these costs. 
The short-term and steep rise of energy bills impacts on the financial stability of electric-
intensive sectors such as water services and sanitation (WSS), because electricity represents 
the highest cost of providers after labour costs [55]. In general, most WSS providers of Brazil 
struggle with increasing energy bills. For example, the WSS sector reduced its overall energy 
consumption in 2015, but its total energy costs were 50% higher due to the high tariff 
adjustments and the new coloured-flag tariffs [56]. However, WSS providers under the São 
Francisco struggle not only with rising energy bills, but with reduced water quantity and 
quality due to reduced river flow, which requires more investments and more energy to source 
water, in times when energy is the most expensive. The situation is aggravating for WSS 
providers downstream of hydropower plants that have reduced discharge levels. For example, 
with reduced river flow, the sea has advanced into the São Francisco riverbed and the WSS 
provider of Alagoas (CASAL) has been forced to make new investments to capture water, 
because its old system was affected by salinization and can’t be used [57]. On the other hand, 
CASAL issued in 2016 an acknowledgement of debt in favour of the energy supplier of the 
state of Alagoas (CEAL) of R$ 250,198,922, which is more than double of the amount of its 
existing liability towards CEAL in December 2015 [58]. Its energy costs doubled between 
2014 and 2015 from R$26,356,258 to R$58,727,724 [59]. Another example downstream of 
Sobradinho involves the WSS supplier of the state of Sergipe. In December 2017, its system 
to capture water that secures water supply to the capital of state Aracaju reached its limit point 
of pumping suction, which could have resulted in interruptions that would affect 
approximately one million people [60]. To mitigate the risks two floating pumps from the 
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WSS provider of the state of São Paulo were provided [60]. Its highest costs with electricity 
were incurred in 2014 (R$2,046,293) [61] and 2015 (R$2,395,410) [62], which is more than 
double of the amount of 2017 (R$1,011,238) [60]. In the case of the WSS provider of the 
state of Bahia, its obligations towards the energy supplier were three times higher between 
2015 (R$1,621,000) [63] and 2016 (R$4,560,000) [64]. Other states that compose the São 
Francisco watershed are Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Goiás and the Federal District. Apart 
from Minas Gerais and Pernambuco, all of other states including Alagoas, Sergipe and Bahia 
have total costs per m3 higher than their average tariffs [56]. This is highly problematic for the 
rendering of sustainable services and complying with rising energy costs. To universalize 
supply by 2033 in line with objectives of sanitation policy and planning, more investment on 
energy efficiency is required. On the other hand, the energy planning is not very detailed 
about energy requirements to universalise supply and assumes that the growth rate is covered 
under the growth rate of electricity distribution, water and gas as a whole, which is assumed 
to be close to the GDP [32]. Moreover, there isn’t a stable regulatory framework to attract the 
investments to promote the required efficiency and expansion of WSS. The challenges are 
even greater when taking into consideration that Municipalities are competent to plan and 
regulate WSS, but many lack financial, technical and administrative capacities. Under the São 
Francisco the majority of municipalities have entered into concession agreements with the 
states, but there are many which are rendering the services directly, or through consortium of 
municipalities, but lack efficiency and security of supply. Municipalities do not hold water 
domain, so they only participate of water committees and play a subsidiary role in the 
management of water resources when compared to the national and state governments that 
have normative and management capacities. This has many implications for better integrated 
planning, which will be discussed under the next section. 
INTEGRATION OF WATER AND ENERGY PLANNINGTO ADVANCE 
SUSTAINABILITY 
River basins serve multiple and distinct users at different levels exploring it for different 
purposes, which make it particularly difficult to govern it in a country heterogeneous as 
Brazil. The complexities are even higher if considering that these resources are also complex 
natural systems and produce multiple goods and services [65]. Despite energy and water 
being highly intertwined in Brazil, their governance follows opposing approaches connected 
to the distinct nature and scale of their activities, institutional set up, different economic rules, 
varying degrees of liberalization, unbundling and diverse policy and regulatory frameworks. 
These sectors have gone through several structural transformations along the time and Figure 
10 shows the current governance structure for energy and water from national, state and 
municipal levels, including the watershed level created by law for the management of water 
resources at its catchment area.  
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Figure 10. Institutional Structure of Water and Energy in Brazil 
As shown in Figure 10, for water, the same institutional structure that exists at national 
level for management of national waters is replicated at state level for management of waters 
under state domain. The double domain of water resources raises many difficulties and 
controversies connected to the need of aligning national and state’s planning and management 
systems coexisting within a same watershed [66]. At the basin level, federal and state water 
committees are composed of water users, civil society and public authorities from all levels 
(national, state and municipal) [67]. The basin committee has normative, deliberative, 
consultative roles and should establish the mechanisms to implement water charges and 
develop the basin water plan. For example, under the São Francisco coexists the water 
management systems of Alagoas, Bahia, Distrito Federal, Goiás, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, 
Sergipe and the national government. There are water plans for each state, the national level 
and basin level. In terms of WSS, there is a national sanitation policy from 2007, but 
restricted to very general guidelines, because the execution and operation of the activities are 
under the competence of Municipalities, which sum to more than 500 in São Francisco 
Na#onal
State
Municipality
Basin level: Federal and State 
Committees
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watershed. Considering that most states under the São Francisco basin count with regional 
WSS providers, there are challenges that emerge from diverging regulatory and planning 
approaches of the various municipalities at local scale.  
Contrarily, energy is highly centralised under the national government. There are national 
institutions responsible for electricity policies, planning, regulation, centralised operations 
and trading. From a policy aspect, the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) and the National 
Council for Energy Policy (CNPE) undertake the activities of the government. The regulation 
and supervision of the electricity sector, including renewables, is undertaken by ANEEL [68]. 
The monitoring and evaluation of supply security are under the competence of the National 
Monitoring Committee of Electricity (CMSE), which was established in 2004 with 
representatives of all institutions of the energy sector. The National Research Energy 
Company (EPE) undertakes activities related to planning, while centralised operations are 
undertaken by the ONS. Finally, the Chamber for Electricity Trade (CCEE) is a non-profit 
entity regulated and monitored by ANEEL. The rationale behind the energy regulatory 
framework is that in centralising planning under the national government and acquisition 
under wholesale market it would secure supply and make feasible bigger projects that would 
offer cheaper energy by negotiating bigger blocks of energy. This way believed to keep 
affordable tariffs in place. The problem of this assumption is that price of energy is not related 
to the form of contracting, but to the source. Hydro is the cheapest source, but its 
unavailability in light of hydrological and non-hydrological factors results in higher energy 
costs (Figure 1).The regulatory framework allowed for concentrated risks on big projects, 
with its centralised operational and planning structure promoting systemic overexploitation of 
reservoirs [69].On the other hand, the current goals and targets of electricity planning are not 
linked to overall water demand, or their implications for water allocation and quality. For 
instance, the decennial energy plan is clear in recognising the advantage of thermal plants 
because they can be near urban centres and near fuel source, but nowhere does it mention the 
need to also consider water availability [32]. 
Moreover, there is a disjunction amongst multiple water plans at national, state, interstate 
and basin level, and between these and other sectoral plans, such as electricity plans at 
national level and multiple sanitation plans at local level. Water plans have different 
timeframes, overlapping areas of action and diverging priorities. The different time frames 
and silo approach result in multiple uncoordinated plans with many goals under intersecting 
areas, which are hard to implement in integrated manner. States have different technical, 
financial and administrative capacities to develop plans and implement them, so asymmetries 
are common within shared basins. All of these issues increase the challenges to coordinate 
and develop the necessary linkages between water plans and other relevant plans of energy, 
sanitation, land use, development and biodiversity in benefit of sustainability. Considering 
that securing affordable and universal access to water and energy increasingly depends on 
more than one critical infrastructure, the state is challenged to design new cross-regime 
governance and planning [70]. Solutions to problems need to be formulated and implemented 
in the context of polycentric, highly complex and interdependent networks of formal and 
informal actors [71]. Today, hydroelectric producers explore water at national level, subject to 
centralized regime of electricity sector, while all other non-hydroelectric users are under a 
decentralised and participative governance regime at the basin level. This leads to situations 
where one river can potentially be subject to both regimes, following different rationales of 
each scale and sector, which raises disputes. The development of horizontal cooperative 
planning structures is key to increase participatory and joint development and use of public 
intervention instruments [71]. Today, current efforts to mitigate the risks of water scarcity 
under the São Francisco basin includes a “Critical Events Room” coordinated by the national 
regulatory agency. It holds online meetings with high frequency between the national grid 
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operator, the electricity producers, environmental bodies, large-scale agrobusiness 
representatives, water committee representative, state WSS providers and meteorological 
bodies. The national grid operator for electricity is usually the one responsible for bringing 
forward the recommendations to reduce water discharge and guaranteeing in connection with 
ANA that reservoirs have minimum water levels to safeguard energy security and multiple 
water uses. Procedural justice issues can be raised, because there are stakeholders at basin 
level that are left unheard under these emergency-driven discussions of the Critical Events 
Room. In some ways, the water committee lost its role of serving as forum for discussions 
between multiple water users. Most WSS providers, which depend on both water and energy 
as inputs for the rendering of its services do not participate of the decisions. Although the 
decisions under the Critical Events Room have been successful in preventing important 
reservoirs like the Sobradinho from drying out and guaranteeing multiple water uses, the 
approaches to scarcity usually considers emergency-driven supply side solutions. Soft-path 
solutions in benefit of sustainability, with fewer impacts to the environment require planning 
and deliberation processes that consider nexus perspectives and include state and non-state 
actors of both sectors at initial stages of basin planning. Procedural cross-sectoral 
collaboration, coordination and networking are required at the planning phase through shared 
responsibility and shared resources to reduce administrative fragmentation. To help 
strengthen the basin plan, different water users at basin level should provide long term plans 
of water requirements, including the energy sector.  
For Brazil to advance the SDG targets of improved water efficiency and energy 
efficiency, the reinforcement of both the energy access and the sustainable water withdrawals 
targets are necessary. To advance the targets of universal WSS supply, it will be necessary to 
consider energy efficiency to curb costs of energy, especially in areas where tariffs currently 
do not cover costs. Advancing the SDGS through nexus thinking in Brazil could support the 
development of better integrated water-energy efficiency programs in which utilities can 
share knowledge and co-develop programs. Moreover, it could support a more integrated 
approach not only to water and energy planning, but also to the different policies and plans 
connected to the goals of water and energy shown under Table 2 and Table 3. This is key in 
light of the structure of the set of SDG goals, which have implication for policy integration 
and coherence across areas. Nevertheless, all efforts to plan these sectors in a more integrated 
way will face the challenges of creating rules that make sense for the particular social, 
biophysical, and institutional context in which they exist [72]. Considering that water is 
managed at basin level, the basin plans are one of the main instruments of the national water 
policy that needs to be strengthened. The state has an important role as the producer of 
legislation and granter of permissions [70]. Likewise, as the setter of recommendations and 
sanctions for reducing negative impacts on the environment, economy and people [70]. A 
range of non-state actors such as consumers, owners of infrastructure assets, private 
infrastructure investors and insurers should also be involved in the governance of 
infrastructure interdependencies [71]. This way, greater integration is also dependent on state 
and non-state actor’s involvement, both during policy and planning formulation and 
implementation. They should collaborate, make joint-decision and resolve conflicts [73]. 
There are several instances of public participation in Brazil such as councils, water 
committees, public consultations, and public hearings, but the effectiveness of these bodies is 
questioned, especially in light of studies that have identified capture by interest group. 
Considering there are no general standards with regards to the processes involved in public 
participation, each sector establishes its own structures and ways [74]. This way, arenas for 
public participation have been implemented in disparate ways, with little articulation, which 
can be seen as an obstacle for the promotion better integrated planning that counts with 
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participation of users in the formulation, execution and monitoring of issues that crosscut 
water and energy. 
Table 2. Energy SDG Targets and Related Policies in Brazil 
Energy SDGTargets Proposed indicators [75] 
(T1[2]; T2 [3]; T3 [4] also 
applicable to Table 2) 
Related Policies 
SDG7.1 By 2030, ensure universal 
access to affordable, reliable and 
modern energy services 
7.1.1 Proportion of 
population with access to 
electricity [T1] 
7.1.2 Proportion of 
population with primary 
reliance on clean fuels 
and technology [T2] 
National Energy 
Policy [76] 
SDG7.2 By 2030, increase substantially 
the share of renewable energy in the 
global energy mix 
7.2.1 Renewable energy 
share in the total final 
energy consumption [T1] 
National Energy 
Policy [76] 
SDG7.3 By 2030, double the global rate 
of improvement in energy efficiency 
7.3.1 Energy intensity 
measured in terms of 
primary energy and GDP 
[T1] 
National Policy on 
Conservation and 
Rational Use of 
Energy [77] 
SDG7.a By 2030, enhance international 
cooperation to facilitate access to clean 
energy research and technology, 
including renewable energy, energy 
efficiency and advanced and cleaner 
fossil-fuel technology, and promote 
investment in energy infrastructure and 
clean energy technology 
7.a.1 Mobilized amount 
of United States dollars 
per year starting in 2020 
accountable towards the 
$100 billion commitment 
[T3] 
National Energy 
policy [76]; 
Environmental 
policy [78]; 
Conservation and 
Rational Use of 
Energy [77] 
SDG7.b By 2030 expand infrastructure 
and upgrade technology for supplying 
modern and sustainable energy services 
for all  
7.b.1 Investments in 
energy efficiency as a 
percentage of GDP and 
the amount of foreign 
direct investment in 
financial transfer for 
infrastructure and 
technology to sustainable 
development services 
[T3] 
National Energy 
Policy [76] 
 
[2] T1 - A first tier for which an established methodology exists and data are already widely available  
[3] T2 - A second tier for which a methodology has been established but for which data are not easily available  
[4] T3 - A third tier for which an internationally agreed methodology has not yet been developed  
[5] SDG 7 proposes ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all 
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Table 3. Water SDG targets and related policies in Brazil 
 Water SDG Targets  Proposed indicators Global 
Level [60] 
Related Policies 
SDG6.1 By 2030, achieve universal 
and equitable access to safe and 
affordable drinking water for all 
6.1.1 Percentage of population 
using safely managed water 
services, by urban/rural [T1] 
National Water 
Policy [67] 
SDG6.2 By 2030, achieve access to 
adequate and equitable sanitation 
and hygiene for all and end open 
defecation, paying special attention 
to the needs of women and girls and 
those in vulnerable situations  
6.2.1 Percentage of population 
using safely managed sanitation 
services, by urban/rural [T1] 
Sanitation services 
for all set under art. 
2nd of Law 11.445 
[79] 
SDG6.3 By 2030, improve water 
quality by reducing pollution, 
eliminating dumping and 
minimizing release of hazardous 
chemicals and materials, halving the 
proportion of untreated wastewater 
and substantially increasing 
recycling and safe reuse globally  
6.3.1 Percentage of wastewater 
flows treated to national 
standards [T3] 
6.3.2. Proportion of bodies of 
water with good ambient and 
water quality [T3] 
National Solid 
Waste Policy [80] 
and National 
Environmental 
Policy [78] 
SDG6.4 By 2030, substantially 
increase water-use efficiency across 
all sectors and ensure sustainable 
withdrawals and supply of 
freshwater to address water scarcity 
and substantially reduce the number 
of people suffering from water 
scarcity  
6.4.1 Change in water-use 
efficiency over time [T3] 
6.4.2 Level of water stress: 
freshwater withdrawal as a 
proportion of available 
freshwater resources [T1] 
National Water 
Policy [67] 
SDG6.5 By 2030, implement 
integrated water resources 
management at all levels, including 
through transboundary cooperation 
as appropriate  
6.5.1 Degree of integrated water 
resources management 
implementation 0-100) [T1] 
6.5.2 Proportion of 
transboundary basin area with an 
operational arrangement for 
water cooperation [T3] 
National Water 
Policy [67] 
SDG6.6 By 2020, protect and 
restore water-related ecosystems, 
including mountains, forests, 
wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes  
6.6.1 Change in the extent of 
water-related ecosystems over 
time [T3] 
Solid Waste Policy 
[80]; Environmental 
Policy [78] 
SDG6.B Support and strengthen the 
participation of local communities 
for improving water and sanitation 
management 
6.B.1 Proportion of local 
administrative units with 
established and operational 
policies and procedures for 
participation of local 
communities [T1] 
National Policy for 
Public participation 
[81]; National 
Water Policy [67] 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The interlinkages between water and energy made evident under the analytical tool 
depicts a nexus beyond an input and output relationship in Brazil to consider some of the 
operational aspects of their relationship. For example, having less water availability for 
hydropower generation due to hydrological and non-hydrological factors has led to increases 
in thermal power, including outside the economic model and resulted in higher marginal 
operational costs for the electricity system. In very general terms, it has become more 
expensive to produce electricity and safeguard water under reservoirs. This is problematic for 
electric-intensive sectors like WSS that doubled its costs with electricity in a years’ time. The 
relevant connection between the water sector and energy is not so much about the quantity of 
energy required to render WSS, but the rising costs of this energy, which in some cases 
represents more than 60% of the total costs of WSS providers. Connected to high levels of 
inefficiency that translate into energy and water losses, it does not support advances to the 
SDG 6 (water). WSS not only face higher energy bills, but in many cases face lower water 
quantity and quality for the rendering of the services. Despite the rises in thermal generation 
and other sources, such as wind in the Northeast subsystem to help safeguard water under 
reservoirs, it has also been necessary to reduce water discharge levels of major hydropower 
plants of Brazil to guarantee multiple water uses and energy security. This is problematic for 
water and energy intensive sectors like WSS, because they need more energy to source water 
from other basins or from deeper underground levels in times when energy is the most 
expensive. On one hand, the energy sector’s high reliance on water increases its vulnerability 
to competing uses of water and raises many financial risks. While on the other hand, the water 
sector’s exclusive reliance on a centralised energy sector raises its vulnerabilities connected to 
the regulatory framework of energy that concentrated all the risks on big hydropower projects 
and has no plan B.  
The challenges are even greater when taking into consideration that water is supposed to 
be managed at its catchment area by basin committees formed by all scales (national, state 
and municipalities), water users, such as energy users and irrigators, NGOs and civil society; 
while WSS is under the competence of Municipalities and energy is under the exclusive 
competence of the national government. This means there are state, national and basin water 
plans, while there are municipal WSS plans and national energy plans, all of which have very 
little coordination and do not incorporate important aspects of one in the other. For example, 
the basin plans do not include important aspects of the energy plans. Brazil’s sectorized and 
fragmented planning does not serve well the purpose of the 2030 Agenda. Traditional 
decision-making, planning and regulatory frameworks and policies are mainly restricted to 
sectoral boundaries. Consequently, it is key to develop mechanisms to combine the planning 
of both towards certain common objectives, so that the physical, geographical, institutional, 
financial and decision-making interdependencies can contribute to long-term ecological 
sustainability, security of supply and affordable tariffs. Strengthening the planning at basin 
level will be key increase public participation and to control socially induced scarcities, 
degradation of environmental assets and the loss of adaptive capacity to respond to future 
challenges.  
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